The Rise and Fall of Japan

SIR FREDERICK WHYTE, K.C.S.I.

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In this booklet the reader will find a description of Japan in defeat. It is divided into three chapters: *historical*, showing how Japan rose to power; *interpretative*, showing the forces at work in Japan in our own time; and *prophetic*, in which the future is forecast with as little inaccuracy as is possible in the absence of authentic evidence.

The essence of the matter lies in the fact that, since 1868, which may be called the birthday of modern Japan, the Japanese have never known defeat. They have grown in numbers, strength and ambition, without the sobering and educative influence of adversity. There is thus little evidence in her recent history to which the inquirer can turn in search of light. But such evidence as exists is examined here by an author who has given time and thought to the subject.

Sir Frederick Whyte was M.P. for Perth from 1910–18; President of the Indian Legislative Assembly from 1920–25; Political Adviser to the National Government of China, 1929–32; Head of the American Division of the Ministry of Information, 1939–40. Since 1940 he has been engaged on post-war studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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by

SIR FREDERICK WHYTE
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

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

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Note

THE first edition of this booklet was published in 1941 as *Japan's Purpose in Asia*. This second edition has been prepared to meet the new demand created by public interest in the post-war treatment of defeated Japan. It has been so largely re-written as almost to amount to a wholly new publication.

The Institute is precluded by the terms of its Charter from expressing any opinion on international affairs; and therefore, if the following pages appear to express an opinion on any aspect of Japanese affairs, the responsibility of the Institute for it is in no way engaged. None the less, it is felt that the picture of Japan here presented is drawn in such a way as to assist the reader to interpret the news from the Far East.

September 24th, 1945

I. Japan Among the Great Powers

THE claim to be called a Great Power today rests on a number of factors which have vitally changed since the term was used in the nineteenth century to describe the Powers then in the front rank. The war potential of the machine age has to be stated in terms of moral stamina, political stability, financial power, heavy industry, advanced skill in the industrial man-power, as well as the actual numbers of military man-power. Moreover, the element of natural resources has greatly increased in importance. In view of these requirements, the number of nations to be classed as Great Powers is reduced, with the result that the title may well be refused to Italy, while Japan's claim must be reckoned by standards which take account of her exceptional situation.

Japan was counted as one of the Great Powers, despite certain well-known elements of weakness. In sheer magnitude of resources, as defined above, necessary for a Great Power in the twentieth century, Japan did not stand in the front rank. Her position must be reckoned in relative, not in absolute terms. She was the newest of the Great Powers; but she so successfully exploited the favourable elements in her position that she might be reckoned as standing somewhere between, say, Germany and Italy. In population she ranks high among the nations, with 73 million people in Japan proper, another 31 million subjects in Korea, Formosa, Kwantung and Sakhalin, and 39 million in Manchuria and Jehol in addition to a large number in other parts of China brought for awhile under her control. Her national income however (counting only that of Japan proper) was considerably under half the British, and this put her, as a producer of goods and services, well below the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the U.S.S.R., or France. Moreover, since

her *per capita* income was much lower than that of any other country aspiring to be a Great Power, the proportion of her total productive capacity which could be diverted from essential civil tasks to war was relatively low.

What, then, was the foundation of Japan's claim to be reckoned as a Great Power?

First, it depended upon her geographical situation, which gives her a sense of security enjoyed by no European Power. She was remote from the main centres of Western civilization and in close contact with vast masses of population on a lower plane of economic development which offered her profitable trading opportunities. None of her neighbours possessed a war-potential as high as her own, though her own was in fact limited.

Secondly, she relied upon her mercantile marine (itself a product of her geographical environment) which was the third in the world, though only half the size of the American and a third of that of the British. Growing out of the same roots was her naval power, which also ranked third in the world, but was fairly close to that of the two leading Powers.

Thirdly, Japan's position as a Great Power was due to the conscious direction over a long period of her resources to military and naval purposes. Fifteen years ago, before the "Manchurian Incident," Japan was already spending some $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of her national income and 30 per cent of State revenue on the armed forces—the corresponding percentages for Great Britain being about $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent and 14 per cent respectively.

Fourthly, if colonial possessions be part of the hall-mark of a Great Power, Japan held so large a territory beyond her own shores that she might claim to satisfy this condition.

Fifthly, she conducted her foreign policy in such a manner as to secure the support of the predominant Power in the Far

East during her own adolescence. Her association with Great Britain from 1902 to 1922 brought her into the circle of the Great Powers. It may be observed, however, that she had never fought a Great Power on equal terms; for the war of 1904–1905 with Russia was fought in conditions unfavourable to Russia; and, moreover, Russia herself was then in such a condition of internal disorder that her main foundation of "Greatness" was gravely impaired. Japan had thus never undergone a searching test. War in China, beginning in 1931 with the limited Manchurian campaign and continuing on a greater scale after 1937, made some drain on her resources; but the decisive test was only applied when the Second World War drew to its climax in the summer of 1945.

JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1868

Before making our appraisal of the far-reaching effect of the Allied Victory in the Far East last August, it is appropriate to give a brief account of the policy which brought Japan into the company of the Great Powers. For this purpose we shall be concerned only with the main lines of Japanese action in the foreign field since the Restoration of 1868. In that year the Tokugawa Shogunate was deposed from power by a coalition of warrior-clans whose ostensible purpose was to restore the Emperor to his true place at the head of the Japanese nation. But another purpose inspired the leaders of the movement. They had been able to make some study of the sources from which the Powers of Europe drew their material strength. They had drawn their own conclusions from the success with which these Powers had established themselves in Asia. Being themselves Asiatics they foresaw the same fate for Japan, unless they could learn the European secret of power and use it to make Japan secure from European aggression. Further, they were inspired by doctrines

and traditions which associated a restoration of imperial power with a policy of expansion abroad. They had seen how Great Britain had already taken control of a large part of India; they had watched the encroachment of the European Powers in China; and they had an object lesson, in their own experience, when the American Admiral Perry in 1854 succeeded by superior naval force in extracting a treaty from the still medieval government of the Tokugawa Shogunate, opening Japan to American commerce.

Thus were the eyes of Japan opened to the inherent strength of Western civilization. The date (1868) when this Japanese awakening was revealed to the world is significant. It stands in the middle of that short but decisive period in European history when Bismarck laid the foundations of German Imperial power. By three swift and successive victories over Denmark in 1864, over the Habsburg Monarchy in 1886, and over France in 1871, Bismarck and Moltke raised Prussia to the primacy among all German States, and gave the Prussianized Reich its central position among the Powers of Europe. These were the most striking events on their new horizon when the creators of modern Japan first embarked on their task.

The observer, watching the course of Japanese policy during the last decades of the nineteenth century, can see how the manner in which Prussia climbed to the seat of power impressed Japan. Bismarck's success in reaping such a harvest from his policy of "blood and iron" turned Japanese eyes to the Prusso-German model of the military State as the most efficient of all visible European instruments. The ethos of Preussen-Deutschland appealed to their warrior-spirit; its spectacle of the power of the Throne resting upon a people disciplined to the national service by powerful leaders gave them a glimpse of something which they them-

selves could achieve; and the subordination of popular and democratic rights to the supreme needs of the State seemed entirely appropriate to the temper of their own people in Japan.

So it was ordained that in their most impressionable moment the Japanese should come under the influence of Germany. The impression has never been effaced. The belief in Germany as the guide in public affairs, both constitutional and military; the apparently well-founded belief that Germany was invincible: these twin feelings were supreme in Japan at some stages of her modern history, and through good report and ill have exercised a decisive influence on the Japanese Army. This is a significant political fact in Japanese experience; and even when Japan took a different course in making the Alliance of 1902 with Great Britain, there were powerful factions both in the Army and in political circles who obstinately clung to their original belief. Germany, indeed, would have been the appropriate ally; but that was out of the question then, for German policy ran counter to Japanese interests. Thus, forty years ago, the plain facts of the case dictated the choice of Britain. These facts even the most pro-German Japanese staff officer could not deny. Japan was an island, living more and more on maritime trade and looking to a bright future in world-wide seaborne commerce. Her security must primarily be found in naval power in which Great Britain was predominant. British Sea Power was therefore the decisive factor in Japan's choice of an ally in 1902.

If we go back to 1854 when Admiral Perry's American fleet gave Japan a taste of Western power, we shall see that it was Russia, not the United States or Great Britain, that gave Japan most cause for concern. Japan was compelled to design her policy to meet the Russian peril. In that year Russia appeared on the Amur River, acquired the Primorsk in 1860,

and for the next forty years pursued a Far Eastern policy which made her appear as the chief threat to Japanese security. The threat became vital in 1900 when, during the Boxer Rebellion in China, Russia occupied Manchuria and stretched a grasping hand over Korea. The Korean peninsula was a pistol levelled at close range at Japan; and at all costs it must not be held by Russia. Could the danger be met by diplomacy, or must Japan fight? These questions were canvassed in Tokyo from 1900 onwards; agreement with Russia or war? There was a strong Japanese party which favoured a deal with Russia, by which Japan would take Korea, and Russia retain Manchuria. This was the plan which Marquis Ito strove day and night in St Petersburg to promote; but the Russian Government failed to recognize either the soundness of the Japanese plea or her strength in the Far East. They continued on their course of aggressive penetration in Korea which led to war with Japan in 1904.

When Japan realized that Russia could not be conciliated, she turned to Britain, whose interests coincided closely enough with her own to make agreement possible. Both Powers viewed with alarm the advance of Russia from the north and neither of them desired to see China carved up into spheres of European influence. On this basis the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was signed. Nor had Japan any cause to regret her choice during the next twenty years. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was, in the first place, the decisive proof that Japan had entered the company of the Great Powers. In the second place, it was a source of important financial assistance from the London money market. In the third place, in the war against Russia (1904–5), the Alliance gave her security against the interference of any third Power. In the fourth place, it put Japan on the winning side in the Great War.

JAPAN AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

This may not have appeared to give her any positive advantage in view of the decisions of the victorious Powers at the Washington Conference in 1922, but it still further enhanced Japan's international position by virtue of the place she secured as a permanent member of the Council in the League of Nations, and by virtue of the territorial and strategic advantages which she secured in the Pacific. In Japanese eyes, however, there were causes for dissatisfaction. Not only did Japan fail to secure full recognition of racial equality, but she was deprived of some of her gains, e.g. Shantung. Thus it may be said that the process of estrangement from the Western Powers began in Paris in 1919, was continued at Washington in 1922, was further accelerated by the Manchurian campaign of 1931 and the subsequent China War, and came to its climax in 1940.

The Washington Conference figured in Japanese eyes as the real settlement after the Great War, for it was at Washington that Japan's international position changed once more. Many Japanese will be found to say that it changed for the worse, inasmuch as Japan lost an ally and only gained an uncertain partnership with other signatory Powers in exchange. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was brought to an end, to be replaced by the arrangements embodied in the Four-Power Treaty, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Disarmament Treaty. These three treaties may be described as the Far Eastern counterpart of the Covenant of the League, and (like the Covenant) depended for their success upon the constructive co-operation of all parties. For reasons too well known to need emphasis here, that co-operation was lacking, and within some years of the signing of the Treaties, the conditions favourable to their success—one might say, their very survival—had changed and were soon to disappear. Not

only did the disturbances of the Chinese Civil War make it difficult for well-disposed Powers to act in the letter or the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty, but they made it all too easy for the Japanese Army in China to violate both at will, and, coupled with China's railway building in Manchuria, opened the way to the Manchurian campaign of 1931.

Before that year, moreover, and with increasing effect in the period 1929–33, the onset of the Economic Depression had made the task of international co-operation more difficult, mainly because it drove each Power in turn to protect its domestic market at the expense of the foreign competitor. Japan herself had not been backward in the tariff protection of her own markets. She maintained high duties at home; she had killed foreign trade in Korea, and after 1931 she pursued the same policy in Manchuria. The pot was as black as the kettle, perhaps blacker; but the Japanese felt that they had a grievance and they exploited it for all it was worth. Having pinned their faith to the peaceful expansion of trade abroad as the best means of relieving pressure at home, they found foreign tariffs raised to new heights against them, especially by those countries that refused to admit Japanese immigrants. Japan's predicament was seized by the military party to clinch their argument that no good would come from "internationalism," the League, or the Washington Treaties, and that Japan must rely on her own power to secure her "place in the sun." This plea seemed all the more convincing when the Army proved that their policy could be carried out without provoking serious resistance either from China or from the League. The initial success of the Manchurian campaign raised the prestige of the Army and drove the "liberal" elements in Japanese politics into seclusion, where they have remained ever since. The new "Mission in East Asia" had been undertaken, and

Japan set her feet on a path which led her back to the Army's first love—Germany.

In tracing Japan's course along this path, we find the clue to her action in her own Chinese policy and in the growing conflict of her interests with those of Britain and the United States.

Taking the Anglo-American aspect first, Japan's pride was injured by the cold Anglo-American reception of her plea for racial equality at the Paris Conference; she resented the naval inferiority of the power-ratio of 5:5:3 assigned to her at Washington in 1922; and she felt an increasing sense of grievance against the barriers raised against her trade and emigration in the British Dominions, the British Colonies and the United States. And, in the specific case of China, these causes of offence were aggravated by Anglo-American disapproval of Japanese aggression.

This disapproval became evident, especially in the United States, when Japan presented her Twenty-One Demands to China in 1915. These revealed Japan's intention to exploit the opportunity of war in Europe to extend her power over China. And, though Japan was unable to realize all her Demands at that time, subsequent events were to show that she had not relinquished them. And when later it became clear that in Japan's conception of the New Order in Asia, China was to be a satellite State, obediently serving Japanese ends, this disapproval deepened into active opposition. The maintenance of an independent sovereign China became the prime Far Eastern object of British and American policy. Assistance was given to China, both in money and in material, in order to aid Chiang Kai-shek in his war with Japan. For a brief moment, when Britain closed the Burma Road to the transport of foreign munitions to China, it appeared as if some compromise might relieve Anglo-Japanese tension. It

soon became clear that the pre-requisite of such compromise, a fair and reasonable settlement between Japan and China, was not at this stage to be hoped for. The causes of estrangement, operating through many years, deepened, and led Japan to the parting of the ways. Having already signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1937, she openly joined the Axis in 1940.

THE AXIS PACT OF 1940

The choice fell on Germany for three reasons. Germany had paid Japan the compliment of borrowing from her the notion, and indeed the very name, of the New Order; and the totalitarian principle was entirely congenial to the dominant party in Japan. In the second place, the tide of events from 1922 to 1941 had carried Japan ever farther in sentiment from the Anglo-American thesis of democracy and international co-operation and, as far as material interests were concerned, had estranged these three Powers. In the third place, the condition favourable to Japanese expansion had arisen when war in Europe claimed the well-nigh exclusive attention of Great Britain, if not of America. And thus it only remained to choose the new ally and to decide how far Japan should commit herself to her.

In the early months of the war there was in Tokyo considerable support for a policy of constructive compromise with Great Britain and the United States. Many thought that Japan could exact a favourable price for a "pro-Democracies" policy. But the movement subsided. The German successes in Europe were so overwhelming that there seemed little reason to hesitate. Yet, to many in Japan it was clear that Japan need not accept a German Alliance on Nazi terms, that it was still premature to act as if Germany had already won outright, and that therefore Japan ought to

make an agreement with the Axis which left her free to pursue her own policy in the Far East in her own way. It had to be borne in mind, however, that if she moved southwards threatening British, American and Dutch interests, Japan could not expect to enjoy the immunity which had made her invasion of Manchuria so easy ten years before. True, the League was no longer in the field, and Great Britain was deeply engaged in Europe; but the combined power of the United Nations was a potentially insurmountable barrier to Japanese ambition, and the United States, in particular, immensely more powerful and in a very different mood compared with 1931.

Thus the pros and cons were weighed, not indeed in the censor-controlled Press, but in important circles in Tokyo, until the fall of France seemed to show that the hour had struck for Japan to make her choice openly and act on it.

The Axis Pact (September 27th, 1940) by which Japan took her stand beside Germany and Italy, was signed three months after the capitulation of France. At that moment the first Battle of Britain was still in progress. The great strategic victory of the Royal Air Force was not yet complete, and it was not until some time afterwards that its full effects were generally understood. It was widely assumed that the defection of France had so crippled British power that the end of the war in the West was in sight. Thus the fortune of war in Europe seemed to offer Japan the opportunity of a profitable partnership with the victors which would enhance her own power in East Asia. This was the mood in which the September Pact was made. By it the three totalitarian Powers made their bargain by a division of spheres and spoils and undertook to assist one another "if one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by a Power not at present (1940) involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese con-

flict." Moreover, Germany, Italy and Japan "affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."

These manœuvres have now passed into history and call for no attempt to estimate the advantages accruing to any of the partners to the bargain of 1940. But something must be said of the predicament in which Japan found herself before a year had elapsed, i.e., in June 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia. Apart from the doubts entertained by many in Japan whether this pro-Axis policy was justified as long as British Sea-Power remained intact and supported by the United States, the Axis Pact itself left Japanese policy incomplete. Art. 5 declared that the Pact did not "in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia." Between Japan and the Soviet Union political relations had been unsatisfactory for many years. The war in China had worsened them, and had made it difficult to negotiate the settlement of many outstanding questions on the Manchukuo border and in fishing and mining problems elsewhere.

There had been bickering, tension and frequent frontier clashes for some years back. Something more than the formula of Art. 5 was needed to establish anything that could be called a sound political status in Russo-Japanese relations. It seems probable, moreover, that Hitler advised the Japanese Government to follow up the Axis Pact with the Japanese equivalent of the Russo-German Treaty of August, 1939. There was strong Japanese reluctance to take this course; for Japan viewed Communism with a deeper and more serious distrust than Hitler has ever evinced. The Russo-German Treaty of 1939 had given Japan a great shock, for by it the great European anti-Communist seemed to have swallowed

his principles and made terms with his greatest enemy. Japan had more than once tried to settle outstanding questions with the Soviet Union, but each attempt had failed. In the new circumstances of the war, however, *raison d'état* overcame the former obstacles, and on April 13th, 1941, a treaty of neutrality was signed in Moscow in the following terms:

PACT OF NEUTRALITY SIGNED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN IN MOSCOW, APRIL 13TH, 1941, WITH A JOINT BROADCAST STATEMENT APPENDED[1]

(*a*) *Pact of Neutrality.*

1. Both contracting parties agree to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and to respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability.

2. Should one of the contracting parties be the object of military action by one or more States, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the whole duration of such conflict.

3. The Pact shall come into force as soon as ratification is complete and it shall be in force for a period of five years. Unless previously denounced it shall then be automatically regarded as renewed for a further five years.

4. Ratification and the exchange of instruments of ratification will take place as soon as possible in Tokyo.

(*b*) *Joint Statement broadcast from Moscow, April 13th,* 1941.

"The Government of the Japanese Empire and the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to ensure the peaceful and friendly relations existing between them on the basis of the spirit of the Neutrality Pact concluded between the two countries, respect on

[1] *The Times*, April 14th, 1941.

the part of the Japanese Empire the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Peoples' Republic of Mongolia and on the part of the Soviet Union the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Empire of Manchukuo."

Neither this Pact nor the Axis Treaty of 1940 gave Japan any satisfaction on the question of Russian supplies of war material to China. It may therefore be said that Japan failed to secure at least one important object of her policy, and there was not a little unfavourable comment in Tokyo when this glaring deficiency in the Russian treaty was known. None the less, the forward party in Japan could claim that the Neutrality Pact secured the Japanese rear against Russian intervention, if and when Japan moved southwards. This was the state of affairs when Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941. A new situation was created which did not seem to fit the design of the Tripartite Axis in its former state.

We do not, in fact, know whether Hitler informed Japan in advance of his intention to attack Russia, but all the evidence available goes to show that the Konoye Cabinet were taken by surprise and found some difficulty in interpreting the bearing of Hitler's action on their own position and policy in the Far East. Only two months before the Russian campaign began they had made a non-aggression Pact, accompanied by a mutual recognition of hitherto unrecognized territorial rights, in Mongolia and Manchukuo respectively, with the very Power now attacked by Hitler; and, in doing so, they had believed that they were contributing to his (and their own) general design. Were they expected to tear up this agreement and attack the Soviet Union in its Siberian rear, while the main energies of Moscow were concentrated on the Stalin Line in the West? Or were they to complete their preparations for the Southward campaign? These questions were actively canvassed in Tokyo, and awakened

the old controversy between the Continental and the Maritime schools of thought. But, before the conflict between them had reached its climax in the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, it became clear that practically the whole of Japan was agreed on one point—namely, that Hitler was not to be trusted and that Japan must make her own decision, measuring her own resources and shaping her policy accordingly.

Thus it is reasonable to assume that the first, and perhaps the most far-reaching, consequence of Hitler's sudden attack on Russia was to loosen the new tie between Tokyo and Berlin and to reveal the instability of the Tripartite Axis. Its second, but immediate, result was to discredit Mr Matsuoka and to bring about the reconstruction of the Konoye Cabinet (July 20th). This was accompanied by all the usual signs of crisis. Behind the façade of the "single party," that symbol of unity which is the Japanese version of *Gleichschaltung*, powerful groups strove for the control of policy. The docile public strained their ears to hear whether the hour had struck for new sacrifices. A "grave situation" was proclained and the official news agency announced that Japan had reached a climax in her policy which required a "stronger Government" to fulfil her mission in East Asia.

This "stronger" Cabinet was formed, at the Emperor's command, by Prince Konoye himself. The chief changes were the replacement of Mr Matsuoka by Admiral Toyoda, and the nomination of Mr Ogura, of the great business house of Sumitomo, to the Ministry of Finance. Some importance was attached to the fact that the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, was a man of considerable foreign experience, that he spoke English well and "knew the Western Democracies." And the further comment was made, in the American press, that there might be some significance in the fact that he had taken part in the Anglo-American-Japanese

negotiations which led to the London Naval Agreement of 1930. It was assumed by those who took this point of view, that he would not have been sent to the Gaimusho in July if the enemies if the Naval Agreement—i.e., the "reckless men"—had been in the ascendant. But it seems just as likely that his appointment denoted a shift in the Navy–Army balance in Tokyo, with the Navy taking increased prominence owing to the South Seas campaign.

Apart from this, the colour of the Cabinet did not appear to be of deeper aggressive dye than that of its predecessor. In what sense, therefore, could it be described as "stronger"? For what purpose was its "strength" designed? On this question the new declaration of policy shed no new light; and, despite evidence of military activity in the calling-up of additional classes of men for army service, it seemed at the end of July that no "drastic action" was imminent. The "stronger" Cabinet had come into power, it seemed, with a mandate of preparedness for any eventuality, with both Services cleared for action. As far as the civil element in the Government was concerned it had long been subordinate to the Armed Forces, and only exercised a fluctuating influence of moderation round the Throne.

During the brief reign of the Konoye Cabinet the omens in the sky encouraged the Japanese Army to believe that the hour of a new departure was about to strike. General Tojo, the Minister of War, daily urged his colleagues to prepare a shattering blow. He had no objection to the continuance of pacifying negotiations in Washington for they provided a screen to hide the place where the blow would fall. When they had served their purpose, the mask was thrown aside, Prince Konoye had to resign as Prime Minister, and Tojo himself took his place and led Japan into war at Pearl Harbour. Tojo held the offices of Prime Minister and War

Minister; and, with the tide of Japanese success in full flood, the popularity of his Government stood high. The first sign of impending change was shown when Tojo created a new Ministry of Munitions (described in some telegrams as a Ministry of Supply) and took charge of it in order to deal with threatened shortages in aircraft and ships. Before long this attempt to concentrate power in his own hands provoked resistance both from certain Army groups and from big business; but it was not until the summer of 1944 that these forces of discontent coalesced in a hostile movement which drove him from power.

STRESS OF WAR IN JAPAN

The shadow of the coming event of defeat had been long in showing itself; but when it was clear that the tide of war was turning, successive changes in the Tojo Government revealed the extent to which tension was growing in Tokyo. His Cabinet remained in power from October 1941 till July 1944; but during the summer of the latter year his position—as stated above—became increasingly difficult and, when the Americans captured the key island of Saipan, he saw the writing on the wall and resigned. We need not concern ourselves here with the various shifts to which he was driven during the last months of his premiership, because the manner in which he was replaced was more significant than even the cause of his fall. In the weeks preceding his resignation there were anxious discussions behind the scenes in Tokyo, and eventually the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, after consultation with a conference of former prime ministers and members of the Imperial Household, recommended to the Throne the unusual procedure of nominating *two* high personages to co-operate in finding the new Cabinet. These two were General Koiso, who was presumed to

command the confidence of the General Staff, and Admiral Yonai, who himself had been Prime Minister in 1940. This decision to make senior officers of the two fighting services jointly responsible for the character of the new Cabinet showed that the Emperor's advisers were anxious to bridge the widening gulf between naval and military factions in Tokyo. There was one further point in Admiral Yonai's favour: during his premiership early in 1940 he had established better relations both with the great Trusts (*Zaibatsu*) and with their political henchmen in the Diet.

From this it seems clear that Japan's big industry had grown restive under Tojo's dictatorial ways and that they had to be placated by the appointment of at least three of their nominees to the new Cabinet. It must not be assumed that this sop to industrial and civil opinion denoted any departure from the totalitarian-militarist policy of the Tojo Cabinet; it is rather to be read as an attempt by the Emperor's advisers to create something that would look like an effective government of national concentration. One of the most significant appointments of the Koiso-Yonai Government was the return of Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Foreign Office. Shigemitsu is the ablest and most experienced professional diplomatist in contemporary Japan, having served in China, Germany and the United Kingdom where he was Japanese Ambassador in London from 1938 to 1941. Shigemitsu is a realist. It would be a mistake to suppose that merely because he has followed a purely civilian career he is "liberal" or "moderate." Indeed, ever since he lost his leg in the Korean Incident in Shanghai some years ago he has been regarded by the soldiers as an "honourable casualty" of Japan's mission in East Asia.

The fate of the Greater East Asia Ministry under the Koiso Government was one indication of Shigemitsu's

strength. This Ministry had been set up during Tojo's tenure of power, largely on the demand of the Army, to supervise the administration and economic relations of all Japanese-occupied territories not formally under Japanese sovereignty. It was, indeed, a very thinly disguised Colonial Ministry and, as such, it was in conflict with the Foreign Ministry's policy of treating "Manchukuo", the Nanking Government in China, Siam and the new régimes in Burma and the Philippines as formally equal sovereign States, and thus enabling Japan to obtain some genuine support in these countries for her "leadership."

With the strong-willed Shigemitsu as Foreign Minister, the cause of the diplomats' department was ably upheld and the Greater East Asia Ministry under Aoki was checked in its activity, with the result that a permanent tension existed between the two Ministries and neither was able to function effectively. When Koiso took office, the deadlock was resolved, not by dissolving the Greater East Asia Ministry—which would have entailed too great a loss of face for Japan—but by giving both Ministries to Shigemitsu, who was thus in a position to subordinate the rival department to his own policy. This was a striking victory for a career diplomat who had gained an ascendancy over the militarists by sheer ability and strength of character. Though he left office once more in the fall of the Koiso-Yonai Cabinet eight months later, he had to be brought back again in August 1945 to carry out the unprecedented task of executing the terms imposed by the victorious United Nations.

THE TURNING TIDE

The circumstances in which the Koiso-Yonai Cabinet came into power in 1944 and fell in 1945 were: (a) the successful pressure of the United Nations on the outer ring

of Japanese Pacific defence; (b) the rapid decline and eventual defeat of Germany in Europe; and finally, (c) the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the Russo-Japanese Pact of Neutrality signed in 1941. Taken together these denoted so radical a change in the war prospects of Japan that a new Government had to be found to deal with it. The new Government was formed by Admiral Baron Suzuki in April: that is to say that Tokyo already saw the writing on the wall *before* the Russian declaration of war and *before* the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. The Suzuki premiership was therefore to be interpreted as the first of a series of steps by which the aggressive militarists sought to shift the responsibility for the impending disaster from the shoulders of the General Staff to others.

One of the most significant events in this period was the journey of the Prime Minister, General Koiso, to the Sacred Shrine at Ise to seek the forgiveness of the Imperial Ancestors and to offer the profound regret of the Japanese Government that "the peace of the Sacred Soil of Yamato should have been troubled by barbarian intrusion," i.e., by the bombs of the United Nations. At the same time the Prime Minister broadcast an urgent appeal to the Japanese people in which all the former emphasis on the "New Order," on the "Mutual Prosperity Sphere," and on the Japanese Mission in Greater East Asia" were laid aside and the defence of the sacred soil of the homeland was the main theme. A strong religious note was struck; and, evoking the aid of the gods, the Prime Minister recalled the famous moment in Japanese history when the "Divine Wind" blew from Heaven to destroy the invading fleet of Kubla Khan and to avert the impending stroke of Mongol invasion of Japan. If the Western reader wishes to appreciate the significance of this echo from history, he may look back to the days of Queen Eliza-

beth, when, in 1588, Drake finished his game of bowls and then embarked to destroy the Spanish Armada. But, for Japan in 1945 there was no Francis Drake, nor any "Divine Wind" to save her.

Thus, it will be seen that throughout 1944 uneasiness was growing in Tokyo; and when on April 5th, 1945, the Soviet Union denounced the Russo-Japanese Five-Year Pact of Neutrality, signed on April 13th, 1941, the hour had struck for the new endeavour to place the national administration of Japan on as firm a foundation as could be found. The choice of Admiral Baron Suzuki did not portend either a great speeding up of the war effort, or more resolute action in the war itself. Suzuki was a representative and influential figure, who, after a distinguished career in the Japanese Navy, came to be regarded in his retirement as something like an Elder Statesman. Upon his shoulders fell the responsibility of accepting the Allied terms in August 1945. Decisive in this acceptance were the Russian declaration of war and the catastrophic effect of the new atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; but the actual decision to bring the war to an end was taken *before* either event occurred. The crisis of the war, which had been foretold for the end of the year, came like a wolf in the night in August, leaving the Japanese Government no choice but to capitulate before complete destruction should overwhelm Japan.

II. Japan Overreaches Herself

THE political crisis described in the preceding pages of this book had its roots in the excesses of Japanese expansionist policy. In her ambitious endeavour to dominate the whole of the Far East, both in its continental and in its maritime

parts, she had overreached herself, straining her resources and exposing herself to all the well-known risks of pursuing an unlimited objective. In the earlier stages of her successful career the Elder Statesmen never made this mistake. Their policy and their tactics alike were designed with a shrewd eye to what was possible, and when they moved they had an attainable goal in sight, having prepared the way to it with realistic foresight. The latter-day militarists were of a different character. They have shown themselves to be spendthrift heirs to the tradition of their forebears and have brought Japan to her present pass by intemperance.

The temptation to risk all in a gambler's throw was strong. The Japanese General Staff—and here one must include the Admirals as well as the Generals—interpreted the history of the years between the two wars in much the same sense as Hitler. They saw in the coalition of the Axis Powers an invincible alliance weakly confronted by vacillating and poorly-armed opponents. And when the Second World War broke out in Europe they found in the Western Pacific and in continental Asia a free field of action. The opportunity was too tempting to be missed. Having won comparatively easy rewards of aggression in Manchuria and North China between 1931 and 1939, they turned southwards to Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies.

The story of this triumphant progress from Manchuria to the Equator is too well known to be recited here. Moreover, the dramatic reversal of fortune means that we are now more concerned with the discernible results of Japanese defeat than with the brief and intoxicating success of Japanese arms between 1941 and 1945. No useful purpose would be served by attempting to follow the course of events which brought, say, Indo-China and Thailand within the sphere of Japanese

power; nor indeed is all the evidence available to show how the combination of brute force, chicanery and "quislingism" won for Japan her temporary empire in South East Asia. One illustration will suffice to reveal the manner in which the ball was opened by apparently harmless trade negotiations which, in the Japanese design, were intended to provide the first penetration into coveted territory. It is found in Java. Here the purpose of Japan's southward move was well illustrated.

Before the war there was a growing commerce between Japan and the Indies, and shipping services of considerable size, e.g. the "J–C–J–L", the well-known Java–China–Japan–Line, had grown up with this traffic. But since the war, and more particularly with a view to increasing supplies from the Archipelago of materials difficult to secure from other sources, Japan had endeavoured to draw the Indies closer within her economic orbit. This endeavour was inspired by the two-fold motive of using Dutch-Indian products to assist Japan to surmount the emergency of the war and to expand her own "Mutual Prosperity Sphere" (see p. 31) by including within it one of the richest colonial territories of the Far East.

With these objects in view, the Japanese Government opened negotiations at The Hague in February 1940. Japan's view of their scope was stated in wide and comprehensive terms, covering the whole field of her economic relation with the Indies. It was reported at the time that the Dutch Government asked for a more precise statement. But, before the Japanese replied, the Netherlands were occupied by Germany; and the negotiations were transferred to Batavia. The Dutch authorities were fully alive to the desirability of fostering the existing trade, but they were well aware of the political motive behind the negotiations themselves and they had no intention either of being manœuvred into the orbit of

Japan's East Asia, or of supplying Japan in excess of the normal trade with goods which might be re-exported to Axis destinations in Europe. The Government in Batavia saw eye to eye throughout this crisis with the Free Netherlands Government in London and watched with vigilance the destination of Netherlands Indian products. In these circumstances the discussions were naturally both difficult and prolonged.

The Japanese demands were extensive. They included "participation in the development of the abundant resources of the Netherlands East Indies, increased immigration facilities, development of the fishing industry by Japanese residents, the opening of coastwise navigation to Japanese ships, the transport of native material in Japanese bottoms from harbours at that time closed to them and a Japanese air service between Japan and the East Indian archipelago." Their final proposals, which consisted of twenty-two points, included a demand for more oil, though it had been understood that oil was not to be discussed in the official negotiations, but on the Dutch side by the companies themselves.

The standpoint of the Netherlands Indies Government throughout was that in the economic development of the Indies the paramount interests of the country itself and its inhabitants must remain the guiding principle, and that, with regard to the export of oil, tin and rubber, the established customers of the Netherlands East Indies must be given fair treatment, while Japan should be granted as much as could be spared for internal consumption, but no surpluses for re-export to Germany. As Japan controlled the rubber and tin export from Indo-China and Thailand, the release of stocks from the Dutch East Indies might make other supplies available for a third party: in other words, Japan wanted to use the Indies as a reservoir for herself and her Axis partners.

After passing through several phases, the negotiations finally broke down on June 20th, 1941: the main obstacle to their success being the irreconcilability of the most important Japanese demands with the guiding principles laid down by the Dutch. Thus a marked check to Japanese policy was administered, and Japanese hopes of increased material aid from Java and Sumatra were disappointed. It should be noted, however, that no immediate crisis followed the breakdown of negotiations and that the language used on both sides was that of implied regret that neighbours had failed to agree. The Japanese Government, when announcing the recall of Mr Yoshizawa in June, insisted that normal relations between the two countries would be maintained, and that their commerce would continue on the existing basis. But this was merely a pause for breath during which Dutch suspicions could be lulled into sleep. What was plain was that Japan sought to control the economic life of the whole area, and that if and when military and political control became desirable and feasible Japan would seize it.

THE MUTUAL PROSPERITY SPHERE

In these dealings with the Indies, as in their Indo-China and Thailand policy, the Japanese set up legible sign-posts pointing to their goal in the South Seas. The light thus thrown on this part of the "New Order in Asia" brought into high relief their determination to control their lesser neighbours and to play in Asia a part resembling the role of Nazi Germany in Europe. There were, however, differences between the Japanese and German versions of the New Order which reveal themselves when we examine more closely Japan's "Mutual Prosperity Sphere."

The term "Mutual Prosperity Sphere" described those parts of Eastern Asia and Oceania which Japan intended to

draw within her orbit, the purpose being at once political, strategic and economic. It was a Japanese version of Hitler's "New Order"; and the Japanese may claim copyright in the idea, for their "New Order" was in fact a modern economic and military elaboration of a doctrine long held in Japan, especially by the Satsuma and Choshu clans who brought about the Imperial restoration of 1868. This doctrine has had varying forms. It has been known as "The Great Plan of Japan," the "Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia," "The Pan-Asiatic Policy." In fact it meant that Japan should be the paramount Power in Eastern Asia, and that all political control by the white men should be removed from that area. The tendency to divide the world up into economic spheres dominated by the Great Powers, was an attempt to purchase freedom from competition and the pressure of economic change, to free Japan from excessive dependence on the United States and the British Empire, and to fasten military domination upon backward countries.

The Japanese themselves would claim that something more than mutual prosperity inspired their design of the "Sphere." Not only did they seek to reserve it for their particular brand of totalitarianism, but they contended that its peoples have a mystical destiny wholly different from that of Western nations. They sought to protect the spiritual essence of Asia from corruption by the "material" civilization of Europe and America. And though they were far astray from the truth in branding the West as "material", they pursued their own mystical mission with fervour, believing so strongly in its necessity that no estimate of Japanese expansion would be complete or true without an appraisal of what the Japanese would claim as its spiritual motive. Doubtless, the Chinese peasant living in a world of fire and rape was not impressed by any such plea. Nor did the European victims of Japanese

competition in colonial markets see anything more than Japan's ruthless and efficient exploitation of opportunity.

None the less, among the purposes and motives of "New Order" and "Sphere" alike, there was a missionary spirit which was neither selfish nor brutal. To describe it is a task more difficult even than to measure Japan's actual power in war on the incomplete evidence available. To appreciate it is perhaps more difficult still, for it is a peculiar Japanese manifestation of that "other worldliness" which is the outstanding characteristic of the Asiatic mind; and the Western writer would have to partake of the quality of his own European mystics in order to see it aright. But, even if it eludes definition, no one who knows the country can deny that many high-minded Japanese upheld Japan's New Order because they believed that it could serve a purpose above that of military domination or material gain.

The Japanese way of life has within it a strong religious motive, more truly religious perhaps than anything to be found in the civilization and thought of China. Reverence is one of the qualities of the Japanese spirit. The worshipping crowds in the great Temples in Kyoto; the mystical part played by the Shrine at Ise in the ancestral authority of the Throne; even the stage of the famous Kabuki Theatre and the "No" plays, which reveal an almost sacred motive in the drama—these are but three witnesses, among many, to the permeating influence of religion. And those who have had the privilege of attending one of the services of the Nishi or Higashi Hongwanji Temple will acknowledge that piety, reverence and worship are no mere formal observances, but a living force in the lives of the people.

JAPAN'S VIEW OF HER OWN MISSION

These are gifts which Japan will not willingly lose. In many Japanese eyes, they are endangered by the invasion of the scientific spirit from the West; and the more highly they are prized, the deeper becomes the conviction that their preservation demands something more than the cherishing of them at home. It demands active resistance to the "materialist" West that threatens them. Hence the rally of historic Japan—one might almost say "primeval" Japan—against the modernism of Europe and America.

This feature alone would serve to set Japan's mission in a different light from that of the Third Reich. It is drawn from the realm of thought and feeling, and is closely related to the Japanese conception of kingship. Japan surrounds the Imperial Throne with an aura of religious light which is something different from the European "divinity which doth hedge a King." The Japanese Emperor is the latest heir in a line of ancestry "unbroken from ages eternal." He is at once a constitutional and a religious figure, wearing the attributes both of the ruler and of the descendant of divine forbears. Such a conception may seem an anachronism in modern times, but there were many (especially in the Japanese Army) who believed that the whole political and social structure of Japan would fall to pieces without it; and, for that reason, they resisted every influence that undermined it. Hence the anti-Western, anti-democratic movement: hence too, the resistance to Soviet Communism. When that resistance took the form of aggression against Japan's weaker neighbours, it aroused world-wide disapproval; but Japan would answer that she could not expect world-wide approval when she was engaged in resisting forces which the rest of the world seemed to approve. Japan's mission is her own. In a spiritual as well as in a material sense Japan seeks to make, or to keep,

East Asia self-sufficient. And the "self" she wishes to preserve is to her so precious that she would take a terrible risk in defending it.

This is genuine idealism in a Japanese form. Where its Japanese upholders go wrong, is in supposing that they can defend their essential historic Japan against the hostile influence of Western science and Western political ideas by destroying the power and possessions of Western nations in East Asia. Their true enemy is not the British Empire nor the United States, nor even the Soviet Union; it is the spirit of the modern world in which science is the source of progress and power. And when Japan established her industry, her Army, her Fleet and her Air Force on the foundation of applied science, she brought into her national life, of her own free will, the very influence which she now professes to fear—the influence of the scientific spirit, searching and relentless, which gnaws the roots of her ancient faith.

Small wonder that there has been ferment in Japan. She has been in a predicament, caught on the horns of a dilemma which pierced her vitals. She would have liked her young men to fight with the Spartan spirit of the old Samurai; yet she knew they had to fight their battles with modern weapons. And he who either makes or uses the internal-combustion engine is not likely to remain long immune from the penetrating effect of scientific teaching even on the simplest minds. The problem is set for Japan to solve. No one can solve it for her.

The material objects of the "Sphere" were similar to those of Germany's *Lebensraum* in Europe. Both totalitarian Powers designed for themselves a practical monopoly of industrialization, allotting to the satellite States the function of obedient purchasers of finished products, the purveyors of raw materials and food; in a word, the hewers of wood and the

drawers of water in the service of the master. Strategically, the Japanese plan provided a defensive zone composed of the subject States, interposed between the metropolitan Power of the New Order (i.e., Japan) and her potential enemies (the U.S.S.R., the United States and the British Empire). The Japanese exponents of the New Order gave little precise definition either of the principles or of its geographical limits. The general totalitarian purpose, the specific economic motive, and the strategic aim were clear enough.

The geographical limits of the Japanese "New Order" appeared to include the Empire of Japan, the Empire of Manchukuo, a still undefined area in China, possibly to include the whole; and, in a more nebulous way, its boundaries reached as far as Thailand and Burma in the south-west and New Caledonia in the south-east. On this reading the "Mutual Prosperity Sphere" stopped short of Australia, New Zealand and British India. Some Japanese spokesmen have suggested that the White races should cede all their possessions in Oceania to the Yellow races, specifying an area 2,000 miles from North to South and at least 2,000 miles from East to West as the general extent of the "Sphere." Mr Matsuoka himself in his speech to the Diet on February 24th, 1941, described the zone as self-sufficient and capable of supporting a population of 700,000,000. It may be presumed that Netherlands India was marked for inclusion within the "Sphere," though it is significant that official statements made in Tokyo excluded the Philippine Islands.

Various advantages were sought in the "Mutual Prosperity Sphere": especially, relief of population pressure in Japan Proper by emigration; a practical monopoly of thickly-populated industrial markets; the supply of raw materials produced under Japanese control and within the Japanese currency area, obviating, as far as possible, dependence on

outside sources of raw materials, and on foreign exchange; and the improvement of Japan's general strategic position in the Pacific. By the creation of the "Mutual Prosperity Sphere" it was also hoped to lessen Japan's economic dependence on Great Britain and the United States, and their power to use this dependence for exerting political pressure on Japan.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The first of these points calls for little comment, mainly because recent pronouncements laid small stress on it. The population problem in Japan is still serious, but improving. Japan has the highest population-density per square mile of any country in the world, but is normally self-sufficing in food. In 1932 the rate of natural increase was 15·2 per thousand; in 1938 it was 9·3. The net reproduction rate fell from 1·64 in 1925 to 1·44 in 1937. Improvements in farming methods and industrialization doubled the real output per head in the decade following 1920. Thus there had been a substantial rise in the standard of living of the Japanese farmer and the Japanese worker, but much of this was lost in the diversion of national resources to armaments. On balance it may be said that the Japanese citizen lost more than he gained from the policy of expansion.

In spite of population pressure at home the Japanese have never made great use of the avenues of emigration open to them. Like other people they desire to emigrate to countries with a higher standard of living, and a climate like their own. North America and Australia are virtually closed to them. They are not attracted to primitive countries or to countries with exacting climatic conditions. Emigration to Manchukuo, although encouraged by considerable subsidies, only amounted to 6,395 permanent settlers in the years 1932

to 1937; this figure compares very unfavourably with unassisted Chinese immigration into that country, which was 843,000 in 1927, and, even after the establishment of Japanese rule, 291,000 in 1938. It is true that in 1936 there were in China and Manchukuo 448,000 Japanese residents, but the majority were probably in military, administrative and commercial positions. It would seem, therefore, that the relief by emigration from pressure at home could not be substantial. Japan will have to rely on such industrialization as the United Nations permit to support her increasing population. A large open market for the products of Japanese factories is therefore a primary consideration. Japan views with concern the industrialization of China and Netherlands India, which would lessen their demand for Japanese goods. She does not wish to see repeated in these countries the change that had already taken place in her Indian market.

Since Japanese export trade relied largely upon cheap manufactures, especially textiles, it is not surprising that the "Mutual Prosperity Sphere" being for the most part a poor, crowded, agricultural area, should be an important market. Even so, in 1938, China, Hong-Kong, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Netherlands India and Kwantung took only just over half of all Japanese exports. Areas outside the "Sphere", i.e., America, India, Africa and Europe, took nearly 40 per cent of the total. In the long run, of course, the industrial development of China on lines similar to those followed by India would not be to Japan's economic disadvantage. Probably, indeed, the reverse would be the case. Japan herself has become a better customer to Britain and America than she was fifty years ago before her industrialization began. That, however, is a fact which is unlikely to appeal to the vested interests most firmly entrenched at present; for industrialization in the "Mutual Prosperity

Sphere" would have meant a temporary decline in the demand for most of Japan's usual exports to it, though it would create a compensating demand for new goods of many kinds. Moreover, economic development in satellite States meant the modification of the power wielded by the industrial and relatively advanced country in a vast area of overcrowded and unresisting peasants.

The other objects served by the "Sphere" were the provision of a reliable source of raw materials, and reinforcement of military security by establishing a ring of territory under Japanese control as the outer bastion of her national defence. Taking the question of supply first: the countries described as belonging to the "Sphere" supplied in 1938 less than 30 per cent of total Japanese imports, and her dependence upon distant countries for iron, oil, fertilizers, machinery, non-ferrous metals, ferro-alloys, cotton and wool means that there was little chance of the "Sphere" becoming self-sufficient with anything like the present rate of output. Less than 11 per cent of Japan's essential cotton imports in 1939 came from within the "Sphere" and nearly all her wool imports came from Australia. In fertilizers, Japan's self-sufficiency was rapidly increasing; but she still depended, and probably must depend, largely upon imports of phosphate ores, mostly from the United States and Egypt. The resources of the Netherlands Indies could provide bauxite for Japan's aluminium requirements, as well as those of rubber, tin and oil, and it is possible that sources in Manchukuo and Johore were capable of such development as to provide her with iron ore.

Considerable, therefore, as were the possibilities of developing essential supplies from within her "Sphere," it is clear that there were serious deficiencies which had to be met from outside. Moreover, great dislocation of existing trade-

patterns, and a great increase in cost, would have been necessary to make the "Sphere" anything like self-sufficient; while the war has shown that the general economic structure of Japan was vulnerable and failed to give her a high war potential. With a coal supply which, except for the lack of coking coal, is adequate but expensive to mine, and with very small iron ore resources, she has developed an annual steel output of 6 million metric tons. Her natural disadvantages in metallurgy, however, have led her to specialize on light industries rather than heavy. Nearly half the industrial workers were in the textile industries; her engineering industry has hitherto developed relatively little in the direction of basic or high finished goods—machine tools on the one hand, or motor-cars and aircraft engines on the other.

The weakness of the Japanese economy from the point of view of war potential is even more apparent when its dependence upon foreign trade is taken into account. Japan's foreign trade was actually a smaller proportion of her national income than is the case with Britain. Whereas it is roughly true that we depend upon imports *primarily* for our food supply (which in an emergency can be considerably curtailed without starvation ensuing) and *secondarily*, for industrial materials, Japan (with her immediate dependencies) is normally self-sufficient in food and dependent upon imports for her industrial material and fuel.

Before the war the biggest item in Japan's import list was raw cotton (31 per cent of the whole in 1937); raw wool came next (7·3 per cent), followed by mineral oil (6·7 per cent), pig iron, iron ore, and scrap (5·9 per cent), fertilizers (3·8 per cent) and rubber (2·7 per cent). These vital materials comprised over 57 per cent of her imports. It is true that, in this emergency, the reduction or cessation of her cotton piece-goods exports had temporarily reduced her need of raw

cotton, but the greater part of this item, and most of the others mentioned, were needed for her own use. Over a quarter of her steel output depended upon imported pig and scrap, and another three-eighths on imported ore. The ore could be partly supplied from Manchuria, but most of the scrap came, until supplies were stopped, from the United States.

The statement that Japan was "normally self-sufficient in food" was not true of her position in 1941. The rice-harvest of 1940 was poor throughout Greater Japan (Japan, Korea, Formosa), and the harvests since then have not filled the gap.

Before the war spread to the Pacific the impact of the European war had created problems for Japan. Between 1939 and 1942 the cost of living had already risen by 60 per cent; essential imports were in short supply; and the effect of the war in China since 1937 had been to lower civilian consumption by some 20 per cent and increasingly to divert industry from a peace to a war economy. In public finance the cost of the Manchuria and China "incidents" had weighed heavily on the national budget; and it was estimated in 1940 that, though the total income of Japan (not the budget revenue) had doubled in the previous seven years the budget itself had increased more than four-fold. This was largely met by borrowing; and though it was claimed that the greater part was provided from genuine savings, there was plenty of evidence to show that Japan was then climbing fast up the spiral of inflation. Doubtless, compared with China, the Japanese Treasury could—and did—prevent the runaway career of prices which was so evident in Chungking. Moreover the critical problem in Japan lay, not in prices, but in supply of war materials.

It was commonly assumed in pre-war times that Japan's

command of essential supplies in a war with the British Empire and the United States would be gravely impaired. It was argued that Japan would then have increasing difficulty in keeping open the long lines of supply for some of the most important products, even if they were not cut off at the source. Mere local command of the Western Pacific would not suffice. As a general thesis, this was true; and nobody saw it more clearly than Japan herself. Japan's problem of supply could therefore be solved only if she could meet it as far as possible by laying up reserves in advance or, when war broke out, by capturing some of the sources of vital materials by conquest of new territory.

We now know that she covered her risks in both ways. The manner in which she did this is well known, although the magnitude of her stock-piled reserves at any given date could never be accurately stated. Japan was only able to surmount the risks indicated above because in her first year she was able to secure for herself, to an extent beyond anything contemplated by any British or American forecast, large supplies of vital materials by the conquest of new territory. None the less, these advantages merely postponed the inevitable result. The reader will remember that on the first page of this study the position of Japan was described as one which "must be reckoned in relative, not in absolute terms." By the policy pursued since 1937 Japan first undermined and then absolutely forfeited these relative advantages. The price of her mistake is crushing defeat.

III. Japan in Defeat

THE first problem presented to us by the complete defeat of Japan is neither military in respect of disarmament, nor

economic in respect of the control of key industries, nor constitutional in the sense of some new form of government: it is psychological. Japan has never suffered defeat in modern times. Since the opening of the Meiji era (1868) the history of Japan has been an almost uninterrupted sequence of growth and success, with the thread of deliberate policy running through it. There have been checks and misfortunes, set-backs and moments of uncertain choice, but never a crisis of fate in which the roots of national life were laid bare and the national character brought to a crucial test. Therefore in all the three-quarters of a century since Japan embarked on her career as a modern Power there is no feature or occurrence to which we can resort in the search for a clue to her behaviour in stark adversity.

When she has been checked in the moment of success, as in 1895 when Russia, Germany and France stepped in to rob her of the full fruits of her victory over China, she bowed to *force majeure* and was content to bide her time. When, after the first World War, she was once more stymied in Siberia by an American veto, she simply withdrew for the moment *pour mieux sauter* later. These were no more than small temporary deficits, easily written off in her national balance-sheet; and meanwhile the profit-and-loss account never failed to provide a handsome dividend. Moreover, in all these adverse moments, popular feeling was never permitted to express itself in anything more than the superficial ebullience of "demonstrations" in Tokyo. And it may be said that the most exciting of these manifestations never demonstrated anything but the readiness of the populace to submit to authority in the last resort.

The clue now sought may perhaps be found in the word "authority." Hitherto the control of policy has never been seriously challenged by any vital popular movement; and

"authority" has been exercised unfailingly from above. The trappings of "authority" have varied from time to time; now appearing in the frock-coats of a parliamentary cabinet, and now in the shoulder-straps of the General Staff; while, behind these changing insignia, policy was conducted in the name of the Emperor by the Elder Statesmen, the *Genro*, who pulled the strings of the puppet theatre of politics.

I confess that I have always doubted whether the English word "statesman" accurately conveyed the essential meaning of the word *Genro*. A statesman is, in our political lexicon, a wielder of the sovereign power in politics, in an essentially political and civil sense. So was he also in form in Japan; but, in substance and in fact, he was often a Field Marshal or an Admiral of the Fleet who had earned his place in the great hierarchy by distinguished service and, by his presence in the ranks of the *Genro*, symbolized the power of the fighting services at the very source of all authority; while, in addition, the Army and Navy Ministers were never civilians but always members of those services. Through all vicissitudes and changes of government the Army in Japan has held its privileged position, and neither its prestige nor its authority has ever been undermined by defeat. Thus, for them and for the nation, the consequence of defeat is incalculable. No one can predict how far-reaching it may be. Here is the first unknown factor in the equation.

There is perhaps another, possibly not so unpredictable, but also to be found in the long submission of the Japanese to authority. And it points to the possible result when authority is really undermined. At the time of the earthquake of 1923, Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo observed that wherever the earthquake had cut the telephone wires and severed the mains the whole organized life of the city collapsed; and with the removal of police control the mass of the people

relapsed into complete and passive acceptance of the catastrophe. The fire was allowed to rage through whole sections of the capital, without a finger being lifted to pull down the houses in a ring round the conflagration and thus arrest its progress. Some years afterwards he said to me that the most striking feature of the situation was the helpless apathy of the masses, once the normal operations of police and fire-control had broken down. In England, he said, the public would have taken off its coat and looked after itself. In Japan this instinct of self-government was lacking; and the price paid for this weakness in the national character was widespread and avoidable destruction of life and property.

Now are the consequences of complete defeat foreseeable? There is no real parallel with the situation of 1923; and, moreover, in the armistice period the United Nations themselves will exercise authority. But not for long. Japan will soon have to create a government of her own to replace the military régime. And since there is *some* analogy between the breakdown of municipal control in the earthquake and the collapse of military prestige, the unanswered question is whether, in the bewilderment of a strange experience, there will be any foundation on which an alternative régime can stand. The best-informed observers of Japanese life will hesitate to say that the answer can easily be found. The Japanese are a gifted people, but at no stage either in their feudal history or in their modern development have they shown the political capacity which has founded and sustained great systems of government in other lands. There have been successful autocracies and oligarchies in Japan, but no Japanese régime has ever yet rested on the will of the people.

AN UNCERTAIN PROSPECT

This being so, we are confronted with the prospect of prolonged uncertainty and confusion; and the Japanese themselves will be hard put to it to find a stable foundation for any new régime. Their safety will lie in their own ready response to discipline; but who is to exercise the authority for it? It is easy for the outside observer to say that Japan has had a lesson and must learn it. This is only another way of saying that, if you have learned the rules of arithmetic, you know that two and two make four. But if you haven't learned arithmetic, or can't add, you do not get the sum right. This vital consideration vitiates some of the predictions now current in various quarters. It seems, for instance, unlikely that Japan will turn Communist, though one must remember that the disciplined régime by which Russia was transformed into a Communist state is not uncongenial to the Japanese. The other alternative of a liberal parliamentary régime offers no sure prospect of success.

Confronted with this impasse the United Nations now see that their victory may achieve no enduring political result unless the Japanese people can learn their lesson. Hence the fashionable thesis that Japan must be re-educated. And some thoughtless propagandists do not hesitate to declare that the United Nations themselves must take Japan to school during an undefined period of occupation and drill her people to the tasks of civil government and international co-operation. Even those who take a more realistic view are apt to conclude that because there is a task to perform the United Nations have an obligation to make sure that it is performed.

Those who argue thus seem to misconceive the nature of the task and the very limited contribution which any authority outside Japan can bring to it. Nations only learn lessons by their own experience; and, in the long run, no power on

earth can interpret that experience for them. They must do it for themselves. It is only at the beginning of the process of education, and even then only for a very short time, that the United Nations can play their appointed part in making a new Japan. The first stage is the defeat of Japan demonstrated to her by Allied occupation, followed by disarmament and such reparation to China as the Chinese can accept without injury to themselves. Beyond that point, which must necessarily be reached at an early moment in the time-table, the problem becomes one of the interaction of Allied reconstruction policy in the Pacific and throughout the world on the one hand, and domestic movements in Japan itself on the other.

Here, political and economic factors are woven together in a pattern, which can only be coherent and attractive if the Allied designers realize the true relation between them. The political problem will lie in Japanese hands, and the part of the United Nations will be one of influence, not of decision. If the United Nations disregard the moral of Europe's experience with Germany between 1918 and 1939, they will lay up for all concerned the same fate of disaster as the world has suffered in the Second Great War. Led by President Wilson the Allies prescribed a change in the German régime as the condition, *sine qua non*, of Germany's return to the disrupted family of nations. And, in making their prescription, they ignored German capacity, or incapacity, to fulfil the required condition. In other words, they instigated or encouraged a revolution which had no indigenous springs of power in Germany itself; and having stood as midwife to the new German régime, they did what lay in their power to make sure that the new birth should be a miscarriage. There is to-day a serious risk of this European story repeating itself in the Far East. And unless the United Nations know

the nature of the entity called Japan, they will go astray once more.

In essence, the problem is not constitutional, nor will its solution be found in any amendment or rescinding of the Constitution of 1889 or of the Imperial Rescripts which have practically the same authority behind them. The present form of the Constitution has remained essentially unchanged for over half a century: and it is a remarkable fact that this instrument of government, largely designed in the archaic Prussian model, has proved flexible enough to serve the oligarchic régime of Japan's greatest days, the quasi-parliamentary phase of the Nineteen Twenties, and the Army autocracy of the Nineteen Thirties.

In other words, the root of the matter is not in the form but in the use to which the instrument is put; and if the Japanese Constitution (with one vital amendment) were transplanted to Westminster our parliamentary genius would quickly infuse it with the spirit of true self-government. In Japan, except for a brief spell of "liberalism" after the first World War, its use by the oligarchs and militarists gave it the character ascribed by Karl Liebknecht to the German Constitution of 1871—"A fig-leaf to cover the naked absolutism of the Hohenzollerns." And in the mind of its principal author, Prince Ito, it was designed precisely for that purpose. Ito was a strong pillar of the Imperial tradition and took care to see that the Japanese Parliament should never establish effective control over the Executive, but should be dissolved by the fiat of the Emperor wherever it threatened to be inquisitive or insubordinate. By the time he died in 1911, the tradition of the Diet's subordination was firmly established, the Army had grown in power and repute with its victories over China and Russia, and the whole Imperial idea (*Kodo*, the Imperial Way) had gained great veneration and prestige

in the person of the Emperor Meiji. Moreover it was during the Meiji Era that Japan rose from feudalism to the acknowledged status of a Great Power; and thus the Constitution, as designed, intepreted and operated by the Elder Statesmen of whom Prince Ito was the chief, gained the sanction of success.

JAPAN FOLLOWS THE FASHION

A somewhat different phase was ushered in by the victory of the Allies in 1918. Japan's partners in victory were democratic Powers; the main thesis of peace-making was strongly tinged with international liberalism; and the slogan of victory sounded the tocsin for all autocrats. Discreetly, Prince Saionji (the last of the Elder Statesmen of the old school) advised his Imperial master to swim with the flowing tide; and, having a more adaptable and pliant mind than Ito, he steered Japanese policy on a course which kept the country for a while in line with the new internationalism of Geneva and gave moderate encouragement to the hopes of Japanese democrats at home. But, be it observed, the new course was chosen by the Emperor's shrewd adviser, not forced upon him by a powerful and self-reliant Parliament. The source of authority remained unchanged, though decently veiled by something a little less obviously cynical than Liebknecht's "fig-leaf." Japanese liberals at that time were hardly aware how little the root of the matter had changed. They were wont to say that the era of true constitutional and parliamentary government had dawned, that Japan had turned her back on absolutism and oligarchy, and that the Diet in Tokyo was in a fair way to become the sovereign authority like the House of Commons.

These were illusions, or if not illusions, at least premature. During the very hey-day of the post-war phase of "demo-

cracy" in Japan I heard Saionji's successors say that nothing had really changed, that not in their life-time would Japan be thus transformed and that it was not in the Japanese nature to make a government "of the people, by the people, for the people." For the people—yes: but not of or by them. Some of those who spoke thus sounded sincere in their regret that this conclusion was forced on them; others had no regrets; Japan's destiny was not in doubt, and the hierarchy of authority of which they themselves were a part suited her whole character and purpose. Democracy was a foreign body, inappropriate, unnatural and dangerous.

Many foreign critics of Japan have discounted this estimate, describing it as part of the special pleading of the ruling class designed to prove that without them the Japanese would be a helpless and leaderless flock of sheep. But the thesis itself cannot be dismissed so airily. There is unfortunately only too much evidence to support it; and in the story of the past fifteen years there is little or no evidence to rebut it. The Army brushed the so-called "liberal" forces aside like so many dummies; and the two leading parties accepted with docile equanimity their own death sentence when the "Imperial Rule Association" was formed in 1940 in order to demonstrate the unity of Japan in her "moment of fate."

Some commentators have been rash enough to explain this consolidation of parties merely as the Japanese equivalent of the British party truce on which Mr Churchill's Cabinet stood throughout the war. This is, in its turn, special pleading of a dangerous kind; for it assumes that now the war is over we shall find in Japan a choice of parties with whom to co-operate. Nothing could be farther from the truth. There was never a vigorous party life in Japanese politics at the best; there will be little or none in the future.

No doubt, it was the habit of Western observers to describe the Minseito Party as "liberal" and the Seiyukai as "conservative"; but those who so labelled these two groups were guilty of the prime error into which we all fall too easily; the error of using European terms to describe Japanese phenomena. The only safe rule when approaching Japan is to drop overboard the European lexicon of politics—especially those expressive words which derive their significance from the political history of England—and examine all Japanese institutions in their Japanese setting and origin. "Liberalism," "Democracy," even the Throne itself; these demand caution from those who look at them with Western eyes. I have usually found that the shrewder Japanese, when talking "off the record" (as they sometimes did, though not often) were baffled to define in English the real character of their own institutions.

OUR PREDICAMENT

We are thus confronted by a real predicament. The United Nations have declared that they will only recognize a "new" Japan, the deduction being that we shall find, or can help to bring into existence, a self-reliant and progressive Government. There is no evidence to show that there are even the elements available out of which a Government of this kind could be created, *if all existing elements are banned because of complicity in aggression.* It is, of course, not our predicament but Japan's. The United Nations even in the moment of undisputed control in the Far East cannot design the future of Japan. That can only be done by the Japanese themselves. Nor can they create something out of nothing. If they reject all the powers-that-be on the ground that they were responsible for war, there will only remain some uncertain, inexperienced and probably unrepresentative groups of the "Left"

(a very doubtful term in Japan) with a negligible reinforcement of those Japanese who fled to Chungking or elsewhere when the storm broke. And in respect of the *Nisei*, who are American citizens of Japanese race, it is difficult to share the belief of some Americans that they will prove reliable and effective props of a democratic régime.

Moreover, the United Nations must decide what their own declarations mean. President Roosevelt, in his broadcast of Christmas 1943, said of the German problem: "We intend to rid them once and for all of Nazism and Prussian militarism and the fantastic and disastrous notion that they constitute the master race." Substitute "Japanese" for "Nazism and Prussian militarism" in this declaration and it may then be taken as the President's statement of the Allied purpose in Japan which he defined in the same broadcast as "the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression."

A week later Chiang Kai-shek, in a New Year broadcast, said that "the Japanese political system must be purged of every vestige of aggressive elements." One American writer (Mr T. A. Bisson: "The Price of Peace for Japan," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1944) assumes that this places "the responsibility on the United Nations for this drastic action" and concludes that the United Nations "*must assume direct responsibility for the type of political and social structure established in Japan after her defeat.*" And, in order that there be no doubt of his meaning, he says that, as a corollary to Japanese disarmament, "a further step should be adopted," namely, "officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and naval captains upwards might have to be interned or exiled for a number of years after the war." Disarmament might automatically achieve the result of disbanding the dangerous "young officer" class, but Mr Bisson is apparently not con-

cerned with them and confines himself to the task of depriving senior officers of "freedom and immunity." How and by whom these thousands of officers are to be retained in exile or internment, Mr Bisson does not say. But, if this estimate of the suggested Carthaginian peace is accepted, the United Nations will have to undertake sentry-duty in the Pacific on a scale not usually contemplated by the protagonists of collective security.

It is pertinent to remember, moreover, that one of the powerful instruments of militarism was the Reservists Association into which large numbers of the male population automatically pass when they have completed their statutory periods of service. These periods were two years from the age of 20–21 in army proper, five years in the active reserve, followed again by twelve years in the second-line reserve. By this time the age of 40–41 years will have been reached; and whether the conscript then passed into the Militia or not, it was the duty of the Reservists Association to keep him in contact with the army. It is reported that the Association was recently used by the General Staff to create out of the older men the Japanese equivalent of the British Home Guard. And it cannot be doubted that this organization, operating in each of the seventeen divisional districts, was one of the mainstays of militarism especially in rural Japan. Even if it be formally dissolved by the United Nations as a measure of disarmament, it would be no easy task to destroy all its widespread ramifications.

Proposals of the kind which Mr Bisson has made represent temporary provisions of security. They may, or may not, be feasible. In any case, they are but one illustration of plans of a more radical and permanent character that show what is implied in the words "direct responsibility for the type of political and social structure established in Japan after her

defeat." It is argued that the purpose and power of aggression found expression not only in the policy of the Army, but that the whole structure of modern Japan (political–economic –constitutional) was designed in a series of linked agencies serving the object of aggressive expansion. In this structure, the Privy Council with its inner ring of the Emperor's advisers, the Cabinet, the Great Trusts (*Zaibatsu*), the landlords and the fighting services were the effective component parts, the Cabinet being the least important, and the Parliament negligible. Of all these elements the first to disappear will be the fighting services; though, as we have seen, some of their roots will still remain underground in the countryside. Other features will change, at all events in appearance; but, whether they remain or not, whether new types will appear or not, the post-war institutions of Japan cannot be created by order of the United Nations. They must have their roots in the national soil. Of them all it would seem that the future of the Throne excites peculiar interest among the United Nations, but especially in the United States and China.

THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR

The status and function of the Emperor in the whole system has long been a subject of controversy both in Japan and in foreign countries. During the long tenure of power by the Tokugawa clan which was a period of oligarchical rule (1603–1868), the Emperor was a secluded and negligible figure living apart in the palace in Kyoto. When the Tokugawa era was brought to an end seventy-seven years ago, he was released from this enforced privacy and brought to Tokyo as the symbol, emblem, figurehead, fountain of honour—call it what you will—of the new era then inaugurated. He was the monarchical principle incarnate; but the very

theory of his function protected him from the fate that cost Charles I his head in England. In literal truth the Emperor "could do no wrong." The cynic might add, "nor could he do anything else."

On this foundation during the next twenty years the Emperor Meiji (1868–1912) was steadily, and by sedulous propaganda, built up into the personification of a new Imperial legend—more a legend, be it noted, than a wielder of personal and autocratic authority. In 1889 Prince Ito and his fellow oligarchs wrote the constitution which described the Emperor as descended from divine ancestors in an unbroken line "from ages eternal," the original "Great Ancestress of the Imperial House" being the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Omikami. And in order to dramatize the notion of this divine origin, the great Ministers of State would go on pilgrimage to the shrine of the divine ancestors at Ise whenever an event occurred which must be reported to these august spirits.

By such means, by propaganda in the schools, by the constant association of the Emperor's name and person with all forms of national service or rejoicing, the Emperor Meiji grew in stature and significance till he became a unique figure among the crowned heads of the world. By him and through him the Emperor-tradition took new root. By the time of his death (September 1912) millions of Japanese had grown to manhood knowing no other conception of monarchy, nor indeed any other theory of sovereignty but that which he embodied for them. His funeral was the most impressive ceremony in living memory; and multitudes of Japanese alive to-day will say that the immense spectacle of his burial on Momoyama, the Peach Mountain near Kyoto, made a deeper mark on their minds than any other experience.

This was the culmination of the deliberate design of the Elder Statesmen who made modern Japan. Being deliberate, the result of realistic statecraft, was it artificial? And if artificial, could it be replaced by some other magnetic centre which could draw the loyalties of the nation to a new common focus? It is true that many of the commercial magnates with whom Western capitalists transacted business before the war would shrug their shoulders and dismiss the Imperial "divinity" as a myth. But, as often as not, they would say that it was a necessary myth, something required to meet a popular need and to give the whole régime a kind of sanctified authority. Authority for what? For the perpetuation of the power of the Army? For the convenience of the Great Trusts so that they might retain the bulk of Japanese industrial enterprise in their grasp? Or authority fundamentally needed to keep the very structure of the State intact and erect?

These are not idle questions. They go to the root of the Japanese problem. Those—and they are many—who maintain that the whole Imperial system must disappear and that the United Nations must depose the Emperor because he is deep dyed with the taint of aggression, make the matter altogether too simple. They assume that the vacuum thus created will be filled by the Japanese in the democratic manner desired by the victors in the war and that the new régime imposed by force will be stable. Europe's experience with Germany since 1918 offers little support to the assumption which rests on mere speculation. A better foundation for policy is needed. It can be furnished by the United Nations themselves, not by drastic surgery practised on the body of Japan, but by fulfilling the task which they claim to have undertaken at San Francisco. If the victorious Powers are in earnest in their professions, if they pursue the purpose of the

Four Freedoms, if they create a Security Council which will make the new order both collective and secure, the German and the Japanese problems alike become, not easy, but tractable.

IV. Postscript

August 1945 will stand in the political calendar of Japan as a unique month. The four months which preceded it had seen the barometer fall from "unsettled" to "stormy", and in August itself the unprecedented storm broke. For the first time in history Japan was faced with defeat and there was no precedent to consult for a clue to national behaviour. Already in April the Koiso-Yonai Cabinet had fallen in the face of unfavourable omens and Admiral Baron Suzuki had taken office to await whatever the summer might bring. Suzuki was something of an Elder Statesman, and his Premiership was interpreted as the first of a series of moves by which the military party might shift the load of their own mistakes to other shoulders. The load proved to be unexampled. Suzuki was compelled to sign a capitulation in August and, having signed it, to disappear. His War Minister committed suicide and several subordinate officers took the same time-honoured way of acknowledging their failure to serve the Emperor, while special measures were taken to acquaint the Divine Ancestors at the Sacred Shrine of Ise with the calamity and to attempt atonement for the desecration that the sacred soil of Yamato had suffered through the bombs of the enemy.

The resignation of the Suzuki Cabinet left a vacuum of no ordinary kind. It could not be filled by the usual manipulation of offices by which one Government follows another in

ordinary times. After long consultation, an Imperial command nominated a Prince of the Imperial House to the office of Prime Minister; and this unexampled novelty was accompanied by another unique act. The Emperor himself spoke from the microphone to his bewildered people, thereby sharply stressing the unparalleled occasion. The Imperial voice had never been heard at the microphone before. This broadcast must have given its composers many anxious hours. It bore on the face of it clear evidence that the Government hardly knew how to handle the situation; and foreign comment on it was not favourable. *The Times* described the Imperial utterance as "cryptic", while an official Australian comment bluntly said that it "was a brazen notice from the Japanese ruling classes that they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing." Second thoughts may perhaps temper this severe judgement.

The new Japanese Prime Minister was Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni-no-Miya, son-in-law of the great Emperor Meiji and uncle of the present Empress. His chief colleagues were Prince Konoye, once President of the House of Peers and himself a former Prime Minister, and Mamoru Shigemitsu who took office (not for the first time) as Foreign Minister. In a broadcast which followed the Emperor's, Shigemitsu said that Japan must "manfully and with a good grace carry out the terms imposed upon her." The other members of the new Government were, with one exception, experienced bureaucrats: the exception being Taketora Ogata who controls the great Tokyo newspaper, the *Asahi*. He undertook the important office of Chief Secretary of the new Administration.

This Government was unique as a new organ of Imperial responsibility bringing the Crown into closer relation with public affairs than ever before. But it was, in the nature of

things, a stop-gap filling (for the moment) a unique vacuum. The stop-gap was still in position when this booklet went to press, and the Japanese themselves were unable to predict the consequences which might follow the new departure from established constitutional practice.

While these pages were passing through the press late in September it was reported from Japanese sources that Shigemitsu had left the Foreign Office and that Shigeru Yoshida had taken his place as Foreign Minister. Like Shigemitsu, Yoshida was formerly well-known in London, having been Japanese Ambassador for several years before Shigemitsu came in 1938. This new Foreign Minister is the son-in-law of Count Makino, one of the veterans of the Japanese Privy Council. Makino was the *homme de confidence* of Prince Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen; and, if times were normal, his son-in-law's promotion to high office would be interpreted as a definite sign of liberal tendencies in Tokyo.

Another report from Chungking (September 24th) stated that the Emperor Hirohito had abdicated. Further information will doubtless be available in due course; but, meanwhile, it may be observed that a Japanese Emperor *cannot abdicate*. He may assign his constitutional (i.e. political) function to a Regent (in this case, probably to Prince Chichibu) but, as long as he lives he retains the title and quasi religious role of his imperial status as the direct descendant of his original ancestress, the Sun Goddess Amaterasu-Omikami. Whatever else may happen to "gods", they do not abdicate!

SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

A Preliminary Report of the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations

The purpose of this volume is to report the discussions which took place at the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945. It is not a detailed report of the Conference, but aims at making available the main opinions which emerged from the round tables and plenary sessions.

The Conference discussed six main questions:

(1) What were the most significant developments in 1944, in their bearing on relations between the United Nations and the prospects of establishing foundations for a durable peace and economic, social and political progress among the peoples of the Pacific?

(2) What will be the effects of defeat on Japan, what principles should determine policy in relation to Japan, and how should these principles be given concrete expression?

(3) What economic problems will exist in the Pacific area after the war, and how should these problems be attacked so as to promote economic recovery and ensure continuing progress?

(4) In what way has the war affected cultural and race relations in the Pacific area, and by what means may these relations be improved?

(5) What problems are involved and what policies and methods should be adopted to promote the welfare of dependent peoples and assist them towards self-government?

(6) How should the organization of collective security be designed in the Pacific area in order to ensure a durable peace?

The membership of the Conference included men and women from the following countries: Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Korea, the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers came from the International Labour Office, the League of Nations Secretariat, the Rockefeller Foundation, and U.N.R.R.A. The French Group included three members from Indo-China. The United Kingdom group, which included a member from Burma, was appointed by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, which acts as the British National Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

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